Investment booms and asset "bubbles" are often the consequence of heavily leveraged borrowing and speculations of persistent growth in asset demand. We show theoretically that dynamic interactions between elastic credit supply (due to leveraged borrowing) and persistent credit demand (due to consumption habit) can generate a multiplier-accelerator mechanism that transforms a one-time productivity or …nancial shock into large and long-lasting boom-bust cycles. The predictions are consistent with the basic features of investment booms and the consequent asset-market crashes led by excessive credit expansion.
Introduction
A credit boom in the form of excessive loans unleashed from the banking sector to households and non…nancial …rms has large aggregate e¤ects. In an empirical study of industrial and emerging countries over the period 1960-2006, Mendoza and Terrones (2008) document evidence that unusually large credit expansions go hand in hand with over-investment and a volatile economy.
The typical credit boom is associated with a …rst phase during which output, consumption, and especially investment rise signi…cantly above trend, followed by large downswings below trend. According to Mendoza and Terrones (2008, p. 17) , "credit booms are associated with a well-de…ned cyclical pattern in output and expenditures." Two features of their empirical facts are worth noticing: (i) The economy cycles around a long-run balanced growth path and the average boom-bust cycle is at least 7 years long; (ii) during a boom-bust cycle, the volatility of consumption and output are similar but that of investment is excessive (more than 5 times larger than output). These features are in sharp contrast to regular business cycles analyzed by the traditional real business cycle (RBC) literature, where ‡uctuations are more random with a shorter average duration, and consumption is signi…cantly smoother than output whereas investment is only 2-3 times more volatile than output. Similar long-swing investment booms, such as the rise and burst of the dot-com bubble, are also stressed by Schneider and Tornell (2004) and Caballero, Farhi, and Hammour (2006) as "speculative growth episodes" accompanied by extreme stock market valuations and large credit expansions with low interest rates.
In this paper, we provide a general-equilibrium model to explain the business-cycle features associated with a credit boom. In particular, we show: (i) how it is possible for an economy (whether closed or open) to transform a one-time, serially uncorrelated shock to total factor productivity (TFP) or …nancial conditions (such as the loan-to-collateral ratio, the interest rate, and borrower's credit worthiness) into a large and prolonged bubble-like investment boom with standard production technologies, preferences, and a unique rational expectations equilibrium;
(ii) why does the upswing eventually go bust.
Using the most recent subprime housing crisis in the United States as an example, we notice several important features of credit-driven investment booms and busts in the housing market: (i) heavily leveraged borrowing, (ii) expectations of persistent growth in housing and consumption demand, (iii) relatively low real interest rates, and (iv) the absence of signi…cant and persistent TFP growth (or technology innovations). These features are suggestive for our modeling strategies. Leveraged borrowing implies a …nancial-accelerator e¤ect (e.g., Bernanke
and Gertler, 1989; Kiyotaki and Moore, 1997). Highly persistent housing and consumption demand in the absence of signi…cant income (or productivity) growth may indicate "Catching Up with the Joneses" (CUWJ) behaviors among households competing for living standards.
Low real interest rates indicate substantial supply of loanable funds. Thus, our basic building blocks or assumptions include (i) elastic credit supply based on collateralized borrowing and
(ii) consumption reference point-that individuals derive utility not only from the level of their current consumption, but also from how their consumption compares to their own past consumption (internal habit) or the consumption of the people around them (CUWJ or external habit). 1 We embed these two assumptions into an in…nite-horizon general-equilibrium model with heterogenous agents. We …nd that when borrowers have strong incentives to mimic each other's living standard and lenders are willing to supply credit based on borrowers'credit worthiness, endogenous boom-bust cycles emerge and such cycles resemble the pattern documented by Mendoza and Terrones (2008) . In particular, when debt endogenously builds up during the booming phase, the real interest rate remains low, and deviations of output and consumption from trend are hump-shaped but quantitatively similar to each other whereas investment swings are several times larger. In addition, the boom looks like a leveraged "bubble" because both credit and the prices of collateralized assets (e.g., housing and equity) go up signi…cantly in the initial hump-shaped phase of the cycle and then collapse sharply below their long-run trend with a well de…ned endogenous turning point.
A signi…cant change in …nancial conditions-such as the loan-to-collateral ratio, the interest rate-or in borrower's productivity (or credit worthiness) can trigger an initial credit boom. However, both collateralized borrowing and consumption habit are needed to support the credit-driven investment boom in our model. First, consumption habit on the borrower side generates strong incentives for saving in the initial period of a boom so as to outperform the reference point (past consumption or other people's living standard) in the longer run through wealth accumulation. This competitive saving behavior facilitates asset (capital and land) investment by smoothing households' consumption demand. It also generates persistence in aggregate consumption, which ensures …rms'prospect of future sales. Second, when borrowing is constrained by the value of collateralized assets, the incentives for asset accumulation are compounded because undertaking investment improves the borrowers'credit worthiness, which relaxes their future borrowing constraints. These two motives reinforce each other dynamically, generating a cumulative process of investment and output expansion once the economy is shocked by improved …nancial conditions that reduce the cost of borrowing, or by good news in the borrowers'aggregate productivity that signals the borrowers'credit worthiness. In contrast, absent consumption habit, the extra income or loan obtained in the impact period would be largely consumed by households right away rather than saved, which would abort the multiplier-accelerator propagation mechanism in the model by reducing borrowers'net worth and ability to borrow in the future, leading only to a monotonic impulse response of output to shocks, despite collateralized borrowing.
Hence, CUWJ consumption is crucial in our model for generating and supporting a persistent credit boom. However, a perpetual boom with excessive investment and asset accumulation is not sustainable because a rising debt level and diminishing marginal product of assets will ultimately erode the borrowers'net worth and aggregate demand (consumption and investment expenditures), resulting in falling asset price and falling collateral value. In the downturn phase, the multiplier-accelerator propagation mechanism is reversed. Low marginal products of capital reduce investment incentives, and slowly falling consumption (due to consumption habit) leads to insu¢ cient savings. As a result, production capacity and output level decline at an increasing speed, forcing the economy to over-shoot its steady state from above in a downturn. A contraction thus generates a recession. Nonetheless, the recession will eventually end-as the production capacity falls, the marginal product of capital will ultimately become high enough to make investment pro…table again, which sets o¤ a new round of recovery.
To summarize, the boom-bust cycles are created by an endogenous multiplier-accelerator mechanism, which translates a one-time positive shock to aggregate credit supply on the lender side, or credit worthiness on the borrower side, into large and highly persistent movements in aggregate spending and output. At the peak of the expansion, the increases in the capital stock and output are several times larger than their initial responses to the shock, and in the contraction phase, they over-shoot their long-run steady-state level from above. In this process an initial boom plants the seed for a future recession and vice versa.
Related Literature. Our paper belongs to the literature that explains why collateral constraints amplify shocks. More speci…cally, our formulation of procyclical credit supply borrows The crucial distinction between our approach and the existing literature is that we use standard technologies and preferences in the RBC literature and we focus on the role of consumption inertia in creating boom-bust business cycles. A key stylized fact of the business cycle is that lagged consumption forecasts aggregate output while lagged capital investment does not. For example, there exists a one-directional "causal" relationship among aggregate consumption, output, and business investment: "[p]ostwar U.S. data show that consumption growth 'Granger-causes' gross domestic product (GDP) growth but not vice versa and that GDP growth in turn Granger-causes business investment growth but not vice versa" (Wen, 2007, p195) . This fact suggests that lagged consumption contains information about future output and investment which is not available from the past history of output and investment.
An intuitive explanation is that …rms undertake …xed investment only after observing increases in consumption demand that are expected to persist in the future. Otherwise, without observing persistent high consumption demand forthcoming in the future, …rms could simply increase output temporarily by a higher capacity utilization rate instead of expanding production capacity by undertaking costly investment. This understanding leads us to focus on persistent consumption demand (through consumption habit or CUWJ) as a key driver of the business cycle.
Although its importance in understanding asset returns and consumption behaviors has been well acknowledged in the literature, the role of consumption habit in generating boom-bust cycles has not been fully appreciated nor thoroughly analyzed. 3 In the macroeconomics literature, habit persistence has been employed to explain asset pricing puzzles (Boldrin, Christiano and Fisher, 2001 ) and the positive relationship between savings and growth (Carroll, Overland and Weil, 2000). 4 But these models do not emphasize hump-shaped boom-bust cycles. 2 The Benchmark Model
Structure
There are two types of agents in the economy, lenders and borrowers. Lenders do not produce, but provide loans (credit) to borrowers. In this sense, lenders serve the role of banks or …nancial intermediaries in the economy. 8 The type of credit provided by lenders are one-period loans that can be used to …nance consumption and investment. Lenders derive utilities from consumption and land, 9 do not accumulate …xed capital, and use interest income (pro…ts) from payment on previous loans to …nance current consumption and land investment. The budget constraint of a representative lender is given bỹ
whereC t denotes consumption,L t the amount of land owned by the lender in the beginning of period t, Q t the relative price of land, B t+1 the amount of new loans (credit lending) generated in period t, and R t the real interest rate. The utility function of the lender is given by
and the time discounting factor is~ 2 (0; 1). Notice that lenders do not have consumption habit. Our results remain valid if the lenders are perfectly symmetric to borrowers in terms of preferences and technologies (see Section 3).
According to Mendoza and Terrones (2008 , Table 6 ), changes in both TFP and …nancial conditions are the main factors that trigger credit booms. More precisely, about 50% of the credit booms in emerging economies are preceded by large capital in ‡ows, while about 40% of credit booms in industrial countries are preceded by large TFP gains. Therefore, we use both TFP and …nancial shocks in our model. In the case of a closed economy, we use changes in the loan-to-collateral ratio as a proxy for …nancial shocks. But we will also study interest rate
shocks in an open economy extension of the benchmark model in Section 3.
Borrowers can produce goods using land and capital. 10 The production technology is given by
where A t is TFP, L t denotes the amount of land owned by the borrower, and K t denotes capital stock. Capital is reproducible but the total amount of land is in …xed supply,
Although it is not essential, we allow land in the model for two purposes: (i) to study asset price movements and their role in a¤ecting the collateral value; and (ii) to keep the model comparable to KM and the related literature.
11 9 As in Iacoviello (2005) , introducing land in the utility function is a short cut for generating a demand for assets by the lenders. 10 Labor is …xed in the basic model. Elastic labor will be introduced into the model in Section 3. 11 We have also experimented with a model without land and with capital serving as collateral. The results are qualitatively similar.
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A representative borrower in each period needs to …nance consumption (
, and loan payment that includes both the principal (B t ) and the interest (R t B t ), where 2 (0; 1) is the depreciation rate of capital. The budget constraint of the borrower is given by
The momentary utility function of the representative borrower is given by
where C t denotes the average consumption of the borrowers and 2 (0; 1) measures the strength of consumption externality. 12 Borrowers are assumed to be less patient than lenders; hence, their time discounting factor satis…es <~ .
The borrowing constraint faced by the borrower is
where t is the loan-to-collateral ratio and re ‡ects shocks to terms of loans or current …nancial conditions. For example, a positive shock to t implies that creditors are willing to lend more with the same collateral value of land. Following KM, reproducible capital does not have collateral value in our model but relaxing this assumption does not a¤ect our results. 13 The borrowing constraint imposes that the amount of debt in the beginning of the next period cannot exceed a fraction of the collateral value of assets owned by the borrower next period.
The rationale for this constraint is that, due to lack of contractual enforceability, the lender has incentives to lend only if the loan is secured by the value of the collateral.
Allocation without Borrowing Constraints
In this subsection, we derive an allocation that obtains in a "…rst-best" environment with perfect risk sharing, absent the credit constraint (7). 14 We show that there is no credit cycle in such an environment with realistic parameter values even if the lender also has consumption 12 The results are similar when habit formation is internalized. We choose to present the external habit model because it is simpler. Our main result also holds under multiplicative habits, as in Abel (1990) . 13 If capital is …rm speci…c, then it has little collateral value on the market. 14 By "…rst-best" allocation we mean allocation with perfect risk sharing without borrowing constraints. The results are derived under external habit formation but are similar under internal habit formation. 9 habit. Denoting e C t as the average consumption of the lenders in period t the allocation without borrowing constraints is equivalent to the solution to the following program
subject to
The …rst-order conditions are given by
In the limit, because~ > , equation (10) 
which in turn implies that the borrower's consumption level goes to zero in the limit, lim t!1 C t = 0. 15 Equation (11) gives the modi…ed golden-rule capital-to-output ratio in the steady state,
, where~ is the inverse of the gross interest rate. The resource constraint (8) implies the lender's consumption-to-output ratio,
. Equation (12) implies In the "…rst-best" allocation, the dynamics of the model is very similar to that of a standard RBC model with CUWJ preferences. There is no hump-shaped cyclical propagation mechanism in such a model for realistic parameter values on the lender side (e.g., the parameter values in Table 1 ). To see this intuitively, notice that the above program is a standard RBC model with 15 Since the lender is more patient with a lower discounting rate, we must have e C > C in the steady state.
two consumption goods, n C;C o , except the relative price of C is in…nity in the steady state.
Hence, near the steady state we can ignore the weight of the borrower's consumption in the utility function by setting C t = 0. The lender's landL in utility plays the role of leisure and the borrower's land L in the production function plays the role of hours worked. The aggregate land supply L is equivalent to time endowment. Therefore, as in a standard RBC model with consumption habit, a one-time shock to productivity will not generate persistence in aggregate output although investment is more volatile than the case without habit.
Competitive Equilibrium with Borrowing Constraints
Denoting~ t as the Lagrangian multiplier of the constraint (1), the …rst-order conditions of the lender with respect to consumption, land investment, and lending are given, respectively, bỹ
Denoting f t ; t g as the Lagrangian multipliers of constraints (5) and (7), respectively, the …rst-order conditions of the borrower with respect to consumption, land investment, capital investment, and borrowing are given, respectively, by
A competitive equilibrium is a sequence of allocations
and prices fQ t ; R t g 1 t=0 such that: (i)
satis…es the …rst-order conditions (13)- (19) , the transversality conditions, lim t!1
The good and asset markets clear for all t, C t +C t + K t+1 (1
The model has a saddle-path steady-state equilibrium in which the borrower is creditconstrained, i.e., equation (7) binds for all t. We abstract from any corner solutions with zero credit and, for simplicity, we assume that the steady state value of t = 1 in the benchmark model. 16 In the steady state, equation (15) indicates that the interest rate is determined by the lender's time discounting factor, 1 + R =~ 1 . This interest rate of loanable funds is lower than the return determined by the …rm's marginal product of capital. Equation (19) then implies = (~ ) > 0, suggesting that the borrowing constraint binds around the steady state. 17 Equation (18) implies that the capital-to-output ratio is given by
. The capitalto-output ratio determines the return from capital, which is equal to the loanable funds rate if =~ ; or, as in the …rst-best economy, if there exists perfect risk sharing without borrowing constraints. 18 Since = 1, equation (17) implies Q = (1 ~ )
that the price of land is determined by the present value of its marginal products. If < 1, lending. In addition, since the value of is small, lender's consumption share ( ) will be small, so lender does not play a direct role in aggregate consumption and this is what we have in mind for the …nancial sector. All of the great ratios (e.g., capital-to-output ratio, land-to-output ratio, consumption-to-output ratio) are determined as functions of the model's structural parameters only. Once the steady-state distribution of land is determined, the steady-state values of all other variables are determined through the great ratios. Because equation (17) is the demand curve of land and equation (14) gives the supply curve of land, the steady-state distribution of land across agents is determined uniquely by the implicit equation,
where the left-hand side decreases in L and the right-hand side increases in L.
Quantitative Implications
The model's stationary equilibrium path is solved by log-linearizing the model around the interior steady state (see the equations in the appendix). The existence of a unique rational expectations equilibrium can be con…rmed by the eigenvalue method. As in KM and others in this literature, 19 we examine the dynamics of the model near the steady state after a sudden unexpected shock to …nancial conditions ( ) or TFP (A), assuming that the borrowing constraint always binds near the steady state. Calibration. The time period is a quarter. As a benchmark, we set the lender's discounting factor~ = 0:99 (implying a 4% annual interest rate), the rate of capital depreciation = 0:025;
capital's income share = 0:35; land share = 0:05, and the utility weight parameter b is set so that the steady-state ratio of land allocated between the two types of agentsL L = 1.
The results are not very sensitive to these particular parameter values (i.e., 1-10% changes in these values give similar results). 20 The risk aversion parameters for the lender, f L ; W g, determine the volatility of both the interest rate and the asset price and they are hence left free for experiments. The shape of the impulse responses are sensitive to several key parameters, including the degree of habit persistence , the borrower's discounting factor , and risk aversion B . Ravina's (2007, Table 6 and Table 8 ) empirical estimates based on household data show that the combined coe¢ cient of both internal and external habit formation is around 0:8 0:94. In some case, the combined coe¢ cient can exceed 0:95 (Ravina, 2007 ; Tables 10-13). The 19 See, e.g., Kocherlakota (2000) , Cordoba and Ripoll (2004a,b) , and Iacoviello (2005) . 20 Under these parameter values, the implied steady-state consumption level of the lender is small, less than 5% of aggregate output.
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parameter value for around 0:9 is also consistent with the recent estimates of habit formation based on aggregate data (see, e.g., Chen and Ludvigson, 2009 ). Based on this literature, we set = 0:9 in our model as the benchmark value for consumption habit.
In general, the stronger the borrower's incentive to borrow, the more likely the credit cycle.
The results are qualitatively similar under either TFP shocks or …nancial shocks. We present the e¤ects of TFP shocks …rst and defer the discussion on …nancial shocks until Section 3 where we study credit cycles in several variants of the benchmark model. We experiment with two sets of values for the other two key parameters, f B ; g. Notice that in the …rst parameter set (calibration 1), the value of is quite low. A low value of the time-discounting factor implies that the borrower has a strong incentive to increase saving in response to a higher social living standard. Consequently, only i:i:d: shocks are needed to trigger hump-shaped output dynamics. On the other hand, if is relatively large, persistent TFP shocks are needed to generate hump-shaped output dynamics. 21 The parameter values In the top-row panel, since the shock lasts for just one period with zero persistence, any serial correlation in the impulse responses is generated endogenously within the model. In the bottomrow panel, the hump-shaped dynamics also re ‡ect endogenous propagation mechanisms because the TFP shock has only AR(1) monotonic persistence. Regardless of the persistence of the shock, with a risk neutral lender (left-column windows), the land price and interest rate in the model are constant; hence, credit-resource reallocations or debt ‡uctuations are driven entirely by changes in the quantities of collateralized assets. Whereas with a risk averse lender (rightcolumn windows), the land distribution across the lender and the borrower becomes constant but the land price and interest rate ‡uctuate; hence, credit-resource or debt reallocations are driven by the price of collateralized assets. More speci…cally, the top-left window in …gure 1 shows that a purely transitory shock can generate highly persistent and hump-shaped ‡uctuations in aggregate activities, due to the presence of stable complex eigenvalues in the linearized system. The dynamic multiplieraccelerator e¤ect on aggregate output reaches its maximum after 6 quarters of the shock and the increase in output at the peak is about 125% of the shock itself on TFP. 23 The economy over-shoots its steady state from above as it retreats from the initial boom and enters a recession before settling down on a long-run steady state via dampened cycles. New capital formation and land investment are excessively volatile and procyclical, suggesting that credit resources are rapidly pumped into the production sector from the …nancial system. The length of each boom-bust cycle is about 7 10 years long under the current parameterization. 24 Because the lender is risk neutral, the interest rate and land price do not change over time, albeit the marginal product of capital changes dramatically. 25 Thus, prolonged booms are possible without triggering high real interest rates and international …nancial-capital in ‡ow.
The nature of the credit cycle is not sensitive to the degree of risk aversion of the lender.
The top-right window in …gure 1 shows that investment, output, and consumption ‡uctuate in the same manner with a similar magnitude and cyclical length when the lender's risk aversion parameters are set to L = W = 1. In this case, the quantity of the collateralized asset (land) becomes constant but the land price starts to ‡uctuate violently, producing cyclical ‡uctuations in the credit limit. In addition, the real interest rate shows persistent decline during the boom period despite rising credit demand, consistent with the empirical observation of Caballero, 24 Changing the parameter values can also change the length of the cycles in our model. 25 The response of aggregate output on impact is one percent because all production factors are predetermined and there is no labor. In the second period and beyond, changes in output are completely driven by land and capital accumulations. There is a downward kink in output in the second period because the accumulated asset stocks are not large enough to completely o¤set the withdraw of the TFP shock. 26 As changes of the capital stock, investment is a ‡ow variable and is hence more volatile than capital in percentage terms. The log-linear relationship between investment and capital is given by i t = 1 (k t+1 (1 )k t ). In the competitive equilibrium of our model, the capital stock is far more volatile than output, suggesting an even greater volatility of investment. Because movements in other variables appear to be trivial relative to investment, we plot the capital stock instead of investment series in …gure 1. 
Dissecting the Mechanism
To understand the intuition behind the above results, especially the role played by CUWJ and collateral constraints, consider a simpler version of the basic model where the lender is risk neutral ( L = W = 0) and there is no capital. Risk neutrality implies a constant interest rate (1 + R) =~ 1 and a constant land price Q according to equations (13)- (15). Equation (19) then becomes t =~ t t+1 . Assume B = 1 and the borrowing constraint binds:
The leverage e¤ect of collateralized borrowing modi…es the borrower's budget constraint in the following way:
where the third term on the left-hand side vanishes because the borrower sells the current land stock to repay the last-period debt, that is, QL t = (1 + R)B t . Therefore, the budget constraint can be rewritten as C t + QL t+1 =~ QL t+1 + Y t , where the right-hand side is the sum of collateralized borrowing and output, while the left-hand side sums up consumption and land expenditure. Finally, the budget constraint simpli…es to
where Q(1 ~ )L t+1 is the downpayment required to invest in land: whenever investing QL t+1 , the borrower is lent~ QL t+1 . In other words, leveraged lending permits the borrower to …nance investment at a level far exceeding his/her own savings because the downpayment is close to zero under our parameterization that~ is close to one. Suppose there is no habit formation ( = 0), this leveraged lending would imply that the borrower has a strong incentive to raise consumption when income increases, knowing that it is possible to …nance investment largely through borrowing. This kills the boom-bust cyclical mechanism by discouraging investment.
To see this analytically, combine the …rst-order conditions (16)- (17) and (19) by eliminating t , we get
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This equation determines the value of land in the steady state as the present value of the marginal products:
. Equations (21), (23) , and (24) plus a standard transversality condition fully determine the dynamic equilibrium paths of fC t ; L t ; B t g in this simple model. 27 When = 0, the model has closed-form solutions, with the decision rules of consumption, debt, and land investment given by the simple relationships,
Notice that all decision variables are proportional to aggregate output. Log-linearizing the decision rules around the steady state gives However, the -persistence is monotonic and there do not exist hump-shaped boom-bust cycles. That is, endogenous credit constraints, by themselves, generate endogenous persistence but do not give rise to the hump-shaped multiplier-accelerator mechanism.
When L = W = 0, both the land price Q and the interest rate R are constant by virtue of risk neutrality. This implies that when the borrower experiences a positive TFP shock, he is willing to borrow more and the only way to reallocate resources away from the lender is to increase the borrower's land holding (see equation (21)). If in contrast L and W are nonzero, both the land price and the interest rate increase at impact, because the borrower's demands for land and credit go up, which in itself relaxes his credit constraint. As a consequence, it is not immediate whether or not land reallocation is needed for generating boom-bust cycles. In fact, a knife-edge case arises when the lender has logarithmic utility (that is, when L = W = 1), which implies that there is no land reallocation from the lender to the borrower after the shock 27 The lender's consumption level is simply determined by interest income.
hits the economy. However, with larger lender's risk aversion, the land stock, the land price and the interest rate will be cyclical, which would be an intermediate case between the left and right panels in Figure 1 . This is because the lender is a net saver so that an interest rate increase has an ambiguous e¤ect on his land savings. Not surprisingly, these e¤ects cancel out only under logarithmic utility, which implies that there is land reallocation in response to an exogenous shock for an open set of parameter values.
In order to generate a more persistent and hump-shaped propagation mechanism, we need a larger fraction of the income to be saved and invested in each period, rather than being consumed. This is why the picture changes dramatically when there is consumption habit ( > 0). Habit formation creates a strong incentive for the borrowers to save the transitory income so as to increase future consumption in the long run. With habit formation, agents are more interested in consumption growth than in the consumption level. Hence, after a TFP shock to income, the borrowers increase their marginal propensity to save, which provides more loanable funds for investment. This motive for wealth accumulation is reinforced by the borrowers'desires to borrow under the collateralized lending, thus they opt to invest as much as possible not only to ensure future consumption growth but also to raise the collateral value so as to further reduce the borrowing constraint. To see this, note that equation (24) indicates that with > 0 and holding tomorrow constant, a one-percent increase in consumption today due to a one-percent increase in income is no longer optimal because it decreases the left-hand side of (24) by more than one percent (due to the habit stock C t 1 ) while the right-hand side would decrease by less than one percent after land investment (L t+1 ) raises by one percent (due to the rise in the habit stock C t ). Hence, to reach an equilibrium, consumption should increase by less than one percent and land investment should increase by more than one percent. This higher investment level will bring about not only more output next period but also more credit by relaxing the borrowing constraint in the current period. Thus, the incentive for saving under habit formation and the motives for investment under leveraged lending start to reinforce each other dynamically, making possible a cumulative process of output expansion and investment boom that underlies a persistent and hump-shaped propagation mechanism.
However, because of diminishing marginal product of capital, over-investment is not sustainable by aggregate savings and a rising debt level will ultimately erode the borrowers'aggregate demand (consumption and investment), resulting in a collapse of the "bubble" followed by a recession. In the downturn phase, the sluggish behavior of consumption under habit implies insu¢ cient savings than needed to prevent the economy from a "soft landing", forcing the economy to overshoot and converge back to steady state in a cyclical fashion. Therefore, output falls below its long run level for a while so that a recession inevitably follows the investment 20 boom.
Robustness Analysis
This section shows that our main results are robust to …nancial shocks as well as to extensions of the benchmark model, including (i) symmetric agents in all dimensions except the discounting factor, (ii) small open economy, and (iii) elastic labor supply. We call the model with symmetric agents Model 2, the model with a small open economy Model 3, and the model with endogenous labor Model 4. In Model 2, the lender and the borrower are now symmetric in all dimensions except the discounting factor. In particular, the lender's problem becomes
where the budget constraint (29) replaces equation (1). 28 In Model 3, a representative agent in the home country borrows from the rest of the world at the given (exogenous) interest rate R t and solves
where the total supply of land is …xed at L t = L. There is also a new type of …nancial shocks hitting the economy, the world interest rate R t .
In Model 4, we introduce endogenous labor supply into the basic model of Section 2. Because habit formation induces a strong negative income e¤ect with standard separable preferences, labor supply decreases after a positive TFP shock. This is inconsistent with the data. In contrast, the absence of income e¤ects ensures that labor is procyclical, in accord with the US 28 For simplicity, we have dropped land from the lender's utility.
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data. For this reason, we follow Greenwood, Hercowitz, and Hu¤man (1988) by adopting the following utility function with no income e¤ect:
where N t denote total hours worked of the representative borrower. The idea that the GHH utility function is needed to generate positive labor comovement under consumption habit has also recently been followed by Gertler, Kiyotaki, and Queralto (2010) and others. The aggregate production function becomes
The elasticity of labor supply is This elasticity parameter of labor supply is set at = 6, implying a labor supply elasticity of 0:17, which is consistent with the microeconomic literature's …nding of a relatively small labor supply elasticity. We adopt a consistent calibration across all models for all common parameters. Because the steady-state value of (the loan-to-collateral ratio) ampli…es all shocks (especially …nancial shocks), we set = 0:9 in all models so that the loan-to-collateral ratio is less than 1 in the steady state. The parameter values are summarized in Table 2 . have chosen a positive 1% standard deviation shock to TFP (A t ) and to the loan-to-collateral ratio ( t ), and a negative 1% standard deviation shock to the interest rate (R t ). Another feature to notice in Figure 4 (lower-right window) is that endogenous labor ampli…es the boom-bust cycle in terms of both magnitude and cycle length. For example, under either TFP or …nancial shocks, the magnitude of output at the peak of a boom and the length of the boom are nearly three times as large as those in the benchmark model with …xed labor. 29 Capital investments in all models are many times more volatile than output under either TFP or …nancial shocks, consistent with the observed features of investment booms discussed by Mendoza and Terrones (2008) . Because investment is so much more volatile than output, including it in the …gure would obscure the hump-shaped output. But its volatility can be infered from the response of capital stock (see, e.g., Figure 1 ).
The impulse responses of asset (land) price to TFP and …nancial shocks are presented in Figure 5 . Among other things, two features are worth emphasizing: (i) the asset price is more volatile than output, (ii) it is more susceptible to …nancial shocks than to TFP shocks (except in the endogenous labor model), and (iii) the response of the asset price to shocks is hump-shaped and highly persistent in the benchmark model and in its variant with endogenous labor. The intuition is as follows. First, …nancial shocks act essentially as an aggregate demand shock because they stimulate both consumption and asset demand without improving TFP. Hence, asset prices tend to increase more under …nancial shocks than under TFP shocks. Second, equation (17) shock. Because of consumption habit, changes in marginal utility of consumption t is small in both the initial period and the future periods, implying that Q t absorbs most of the impact of shocks. However, since more land is reallocated to the lender in the benchmark model compared to Model 2 (with symmetric agents), the marginal productivity of land falls by more and the impact on Q t is therefore dampened more in the benchmark economy (top-left window in …gure 5) than in Model 2. In addition, a positive shock to the loan-to-collateral ratio relaxes the borrowing constraint and reduces the Lagrangian multiplier t , which also partially cancels out the e¤ect of the increase in t on the RHS of equation (17) . However, the borrowing constraint does not relax as much in the symmetric-agent model (top-right window in …gure 5) because the lender also needs land and capital to produce output. This implies that t decreases less in Model 2 than in the benchmark model. In summary, the negative changes of land productivity and the Lagrangian multiplier dampen the positive e¤ect of …nancial shocks on land price in both models but they are more pronounced in the benchmark model compared to Model 2.
Hence, the land price Q t on the LHS of equation (17) We simply note that the interest rate is more volatile under …nancial shocks than under TFP shocks in the models.
Policy Implications
The volatile nature of the boom-bust cycle calls for optimal stabilizing policies. However, if such policies exist, they must be time varying in nature (for more details, see our working paper, Pintus and Wen, 2008 persistence. Therefore, a constant-rate consumption tax does have stabilization e¤ects when the tax rate is high enough. The intuition for the stabilization e¤ect is that consumption tax discourages current and future consumption demand, which reduces the incentive for borrowing, hence mitigating the multiplier-accelerator e¤ects of the credit constraints on investment.
Similar results can also be obtained under income tax policies. Figure 6 . Stabilization E¤ects of a Consumption Tax.
However, simple tax policies cannot achieve the "…rst-best" allocation, more often they also introduce further distortions into the economy. As an example, we examine the business cycle e¤ects of a sudden, unexpected, (one-period) 1% income-tax cut on the competitive economy with labor. Such a tax reduction is meant to boost the economy by increasing the after-tax marginal rates of return to work and investment. However, we show that such policies intended to stimulate the economy can be counter-productive and generate a long-period of recession instead of a boom. Consider a standard income tax t on aggregate output Y t . The borrower's resource constraint becomes
where T t = t Y t is a lump-sum transfer payment. Suppose the steady-state income tax rate is 20%; then a one-percent sudden decrease in the income tax rate has the following dynamic 26 e¤ects shown in Figure 7 . The intuition for the prolonged recession caused by a tax cut is as follows. Initially, a tax cut increases the incentives for working and investing. Hence, there is a short boom in the initial period in aggregate consumption, investment, labor, and output. However, since TFP has not changed, the increase in output is fully due to higher labor supply. Also, because the tax cut is …nanced by an equal decrease in the lump-sum transfer, the initial increase in aggregate demand is supported heavily by borrowing. Therefore, the debt level increases sharply in the second period and it chokes o¤ investment because the marginal product of capital is below the loan rate. As investment decreases in the second period, the multiplier-accelerator mechanism kicks in and generates a cumulative process of contraction. Therefore, the stimulative package of a tax cut is counter-productive.
Conclusion
We argue that a simple neoclassical model with consumption habit and credit constraints accounts for the most salient features of typical credit-fueled investment booms documented by Mendoza and Terrones (2008) . The model also o¤ers an alternative way to rationalize the speculative-growth episodes stressed by Schneider and Tornell (2004) , Caballero, Farhi and Hammour (2006) . In general equilibrium, consumption growth crowds out savings and raises the real interest rate, yet investment requires savings to …nance with low capital costs. Hence, periodic boom-bust cycles featuring increases in consumption and investment (i.e., comovements) and their simultaneous collapses are di¢ cult to generate in standard models without periodic movements in TFP or multiple steady states. Using a two-agent RBC model featuring a productive borrower who is credit-constrained but has strong incentives to accumulate wealth by saving and an unproductive lender who hoards "idle" resources but is willing to lend, this paper shows that dynamic interactions between the two forces create a cyclical mechanism that is broadly consistent with the cyclical behavior of the aggregate economy during a credit boom.
In addition, our analysis indicates why neither of these two forces, in isolation, can generate such a cyclical pattern.
Our results reinforce the …ndings of Bernanke and Gertler (1989) and Kiyotaki and Moore for the business cycle. One insight provided by our model is that lagged consumption is an important state variable that a¤ects how credit demand, aggregate output, investment, and asset prices move over the business cycle. In light of this, one possible way to address the aforementioned question is to extend Wen's (2007) analysis to detect through Granger causality test how aggregate …nancial and real variables interact both in the data and in the model. We believe this calls for future research.
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Appendix
The purpose of this appendix is to report the linearized version of the equations describing the competitive equilibrium with borrowing constraints (see section 2.3). In all equations below,
x t denotes the deviation of X t from its steady-state value in percentage terms. For example, k t (K t K)=K, where K is the steady-state capital stock. Eliminating R t+1 and t by using respectively (15) and (19) , the linearized versions of (1), (3), (4), (5), (7), (13)- (14), and (16)- (18) are respectively: 
